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Caveat Vendor: Sellers of Real Estate Now
Need to Beware of Misrepresentations About
the Condition of Property
Droz v. Trump'
I. INTRODUCTION
The common law approach to disclosure of latent defects in real property
was caveat emptor, which meant sellers had no duty to disclose latent defects to
purchasers.2 Most modem courts have mitigated the harshness of the doctrine
by adopting a system that mandates disclosure by a seller of any latent defect3
material to the purchaser's decision to buy the property and whose existence is
known by the seller.
Droz v. Trump highlights a growing trend among a number of Missouri
courts willing to further narrow the seller protections of caveat emptor in favor
of protecting innocent purchasers of real property. Most significant in this case
is the use of the affirmative representation doctrine to completely cancel the
purchaser's duty to investigate latent defects.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Laura Trump and her late husband, Wallace, purchased the site of the
former Trenton Landfill in 1980.4 The Trumps raised a variety of row crops and
livestock on the site until enrolling it in the Conservation Reserve Program
(CRP) in 1984.s
In a letter dated February 20, 1990, the Missouri Department of Natural
Resources (MDNR) informed Mrs. Trump that the property was being
investigated as an uncontrolled hazardous waste disposal site.6 Shortly after
1. 965 S.W.2d 436 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998).
2. GRANT NELSON & DALE WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE TRANSFER, FINANCE &
DEVELOPMENT 175 (5th ed. 1998).
3. A latent defect is one that is not reasonably discoverable through a reasonable
inquiry by the purchaser.
4. Droz, 965 S.W.2d at 439.
5. Id.
6. Droz v. Trump, 965 S.W.2d 436, 439 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998). The specific
regulations pertaining to property placed on the Registry of Abandoned or Uncontrolled
Hazardous Waste Disposal Sites are located at Mo. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 10, § 25-10
(1998). Once placed on the registry, no changes, including the keeping of livestock or
sowing of crops, are allowed without the specific permission of the MDNR. Most
1
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receiving the MDNR notification, Trump listed the property for sale with
Walden Realty of Trenton!
Clifford Droz was interested in purchasing land in the Trenton area on
which he could build a home and raise horses.' Droz contacted Virgil Walden
of Walden Realty who, along with agent Wayne King, showed Droz the Trump
property and disclosed the fact that the site had previously been used as a
landfill.9 Walden informed Droz of the Trumps' uses of the property and
assured him that the site would be suitable for his intended purposes."° At trial,
Walden denied being told about the MDNR investigation, but Trump testified
that she instructed Walden to inform any potential buyers of the investigation."
Interestingly, a copy of the MDNR letter was located in the Walden Realty file.
12
Because the Trenton Mercantile Bank had concerns about the site's
previous use as a landfill, Droz secured a personal loan (instead of a real estate
loan) to purchase the property.' A copy of the MDNR letter appeared in the
Bank's file, although the Loan Officer in charge could not remember whether the
letter or its contents were ever discussed with Droz.' 4
On July 30, 1990, Droz and Trump entered into a real estate contract for the
purchase of the property." The contract did not disclose the MDNR
investigation and no evidence was produced at trial that Droz ever learned of the
MDNR investigation prior to the sale. 6 The sale closed in November 1990.17
In May 1991, the MDNR notified Droz that it intended to place the former
Trenton landfill on the "Registry of Confirmed Abandoned or Uncontrolled
Hazardous Waste Disposal Sites in Missouri."' 8 Droz contested the placing of
the property on the Registry at an administrative hearing,' 9 but the site was
ultimately placed on the Registry in July 1992.20
In April 1993, Droz filed a three count petition seeking (1) damages for
fraud against the realtor Walden, (2) damages for breach of warranty against
Trump, and (3) rescission of the contract based upon fraudulent















20. Id. at 439-40.
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misrepresentation. 1 Prior to trial, Droz dismissed the fraud count against
Walden and the breach of warranty claim against Trump, electing to pursue his
equitable remedy of rescission.2 Droz argued that Trump (and/or her agent,
Walden Realty) had a duty to disclose the MDNR investigation because it was
material to Droz's decision to buy the property.23 Droz further argued that this
fact was not readily discoverable by a potential purchaser.24 Droz testified that
he would not have purchased the property had he been aware of the MDNR
investigation and its potential consequences.25 Trump argued that there was no
duty to disclose the investigation because Droz knew of the landfill's previous
use and did not make an adequate inquiry into the status of the property.26
The trial court entered judgment for Trump finding: (1) that neither Trump
nor her agent knowingly concealed a material fact; and (2) that Droz did not
make a reasonable inquiry which would have discovered the alleged
nondisclosed material fact.
2
On appeal, Droz argued that the trial court misapplied the law of rescission
by requiring a knowing concealment of a material fact.28 Droz contended that
rescission could be based upon constructive fraud predicated by an innocent
misrepresentation or nondisclosure. 29 Droz also contended that he was under no
duty to make an inquiry and that, even if he had investigated, there was no
evidence that the MDNR review could have been discovered."
The Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western District of Missouri
reversed the trial court's decision and held that: (1) rescission of a real estate
contract for fraudulent misrepresentation may be based on either actual or
constructive fraud; and (2) while there is a duty to investigate potential defects
where a reasonable person would be suspicious, there is no duty of inquiry
where a purchaser relies on a specific representation made by the vendor or her
agent.
21. Droz v. Trump, 965 S.W.2d 436, 440 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998).
22. Id. The decision to pursue rescission stemmed primarily from the fact that
Droz no longer wanted to have an ownership interest in the encumbered property. Even
if Droz had been granted a judgment for damages, he would still have had a virtually
useless piece of property totally unsuitable for his purposes. Another interesting factor
in this decision was the fact that the realtor, Walden, had been involved in a disabling
accident shortly before trial, and Droz's attorney felt that Walden might appear




26. Droz v. Trump, 965 S.W.2d 436,443 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998).
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III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Caveat Emptor and the Modern Approach to Seller Disclosure
As every first year student of property learns, the common law approach to
disclosure of latent defects in a given piece of real estate was caveat emptor,3'
which placed no duty upon the seller to disclose any defect, including material
defects known to the seller.32 The modem trend, however, is clearly away from
a strict caveat emptor regime and toward a system that shifts the burden to the
seller to disclose any defect that is: (1) known by the seller; (2) latent; and (3)
material to the purchaser's decision to buy the property.33 Recently, a number
of states (including Missouri) have expanded this principle by requiring
disclosure of off-site defects, such as nearby environmental contamination or
nuisances.34  Some states have even entertained criminal prosecutions in
situations where the undisclosed information could have been discovered in the
public land records.35
Caveat emptor, however, is not completely dead. In Stambovsky v.
Ackley,36 New York reaffirmed caveat emptor when a seller failed to disclose
that a number of paranormal events had occurred in the home and that many
individuals had come to the conclusion that the house was haunted. 37 The
appellate panel applied the common law caveat emptor rule and stated that there
was "no duty upon the vendor to disclose any information concerning the
premises."'3 8
Missouri has followed the modem trend and abandoned the traditional
formulation of the caveat emptor doctrine. 39 The general rule in Missouri
31. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 2, at 175.
32. Id.
33. See generally Johnson v. Davis, 480 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 1986); Strawn v. Canuso,
638 A.2d 141 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994).
34. See Alexander v. McKnight, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 453, 455 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992);
O'Leary v. Indust. Park Corp., 542 A.2d 333, 335 (Conn. App. Ct. 1988); Haberstick v.
Gordon A. Gundaker Real Estate Co., 921 S.W.2d 104, 108 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996);
Strawn, 638 A.2d at 144.
35. State v. Young, 711 A.2d 134, 135 (Me. 1998). The defendant was charged
with theft by fraud for not disclosing the fact that there was an outstanding mortgage on
the property sold to purchaser. Id.
36. 572 N.Y.S.2d 672 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991).
37. Id. at 674.
38. Id.
39. See generally Wasson v. Schubert, 964 S.W.2d 520, 524 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998);
VanBooven v. Smull, 938 S.W.2d 324, 328 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997); Stephenson v. First
Missouri Corp., 861 S.W.2d 651, 656 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993); Mobley v. Copeland, 828
S.W.2d 717, 726 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992).
[Vol. 64
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requires disclosure by the seller of all material latent defects that are not
discoverable through a reasonable investigation. 0
B. What is the Scope of a Purchaser's "Reasonable Investigation"?
Unless they are in a strict caveat emptor jurisdiction, courts dealing with
disclosure cases face questions focused primarily on the type of investigation
necessary and its scope. As with many areas of the law, the battleground will be
found where parties need to determine whether some course of action is
"reasonable." In a real estate case, is visual inspection of the property enough
to be considered reasonable? Must an inspector be hired to verify the
representations made by the seller? Is searching the recorded documents
sufficient or should a prospective purchaser go further?
Many jurisdictions find that reasonable care for a purchaser encompasses
at least a cursory physical inspection of the property coupled with a search of the
recorded land title records. The rationale behind these requirements is that it
is neither unusual nor unnecessarily burdensome to have a title search performed
and that a purchaser's willful blindness to the property's true state of title should
not protect her. A California court has gone even further and required a
purchaser to search any public records that contain information about the latent
defect.42 In Pagano, the court declined to hold a seller's agent liable for failing
to disclose the existence of a pending lawsuit on the theory that the purchaser
could have discovered the true situation by searching the public records.43
C. The Doctrine of Affirmative Representation
Equitable remedies, such as rescission of a real estate sale contract, usually
require a finding that the plaintiff did not create or contribute to the situation by
failing to make reasonable inquiry into the specific nature of the transaction.
However, whether a state follows the traditional common law (caveat emptor)
approach or the modem formulation requiring more expansive seller disclosure,
courts generally agree that a specific representation made by a seller or his agent
greatly affects the duties imposed on the respective parties.
Some courts hold that a specific representation made by a seller or his agent
relieves the purchaser of any duty to inquire into the truth or falsity of the
representation, even if the truth would be easily discoverable by the purchaser.
In Mahler v. Keenan Real Estate,44 a real estate agent told the purchasers that
40. See supra note 39.
41. Dickinson v. Moore, 468 So. 2d 136 (Ala. 1987); Sisler v. Security Pac. Bus.
Credit, Inc., 614 N.Y.S.2d 985, 988 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994).
42. Pagano v. Krohn, 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d 1, 6 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997).
43. Id.
44. 876 P.2d 609 (Kan. 1994).
1999]
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there was no problem with the water system for a house.45 The Kansas Supreme
Court held that despite the ease with which the false representation could have
been discovered by the purchasers, the affirmative representation made by the
seller canceled any duty the purchasers had to inspect the premises and that the
purchasers had an unconditional right to rely on any statements made by the
vendor.46
A second approach adopted in some jurisdictions places a duty on the
purchaser to investigate the statements made by the vendor when the parties
stand on equal footing. Representative of this second view is Hope v. Brannan,47
in which the seller's broker told the purchasers that the house was free of
termites (it was not) and the roof was 2 years old (it was more than 15 years
old).48 The Alabama Supreme Court held that since the purchasers could have
easily discovered the defects, and because the seller did nothing to impede the
purchasers' right to investigate, the purchasers failed to protect themselves and
were not entitled to recover.49
Missouri courts have generally followed the more liberal approach to
specific misrepresentations, often finding that the purchaser's duty to investigate
is canceled by a positive representation made by the seller or her agent.50 For
instance, in Stephenson v. First Missouri Corp. , 5 a real estate broker
misrepresented the existence of ingress/egress easements to the subject property
when in fact the tract being purchased was landlocked. 2 The Missouri Court of
Appeals for the Western District of Missouri held that when "distinct and
specific" representations are made, the purchaser's equitable duty to investigate
45. Id. at 610. The problem could have been discovered through a simple
investigation by an experienced inspector.
46. Id. at 614. See also Upledger v. Vilanor, 369 So. 2d 427, 430 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1979); Waste Management v. Carver, 642 N.E.2d 1058, 1061-62 (Mass. App. Ct.
1994) (Purchaser not faulted for failure to investigate vendor's misrepresentation
concerning the environmental condition of the property); Russo v. Williams, 71 N.W.2d
131, 137 (Neb. 1955); Wirth v. Commercial Resources Inc., 630 P.2d 292,297 (N.M. Ct.
App. 1981); Grube v. Dawn, 496 N.W.2d 106, 114 (Wis. 1992) (Broker liable to
purchasers of farm buildings for misrepresenting that property would be suitable for
purposes).
47. 557 So. 2d 1208 (Ala. 1989).
48. Id. at 1210.
49. Id. at 1211. See also Dickinson v. Moore, 468 So. 2d 136, 138 (Ala. 1985);
Evans v. Teakettle Realty, 736 P.2d 472, 473 (Mont. 1987); Dawson v. Tindell, 733 P.2d
407, 409 (Okla. 1987); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 463 (1965).
50. See Wasson v. Schubert, 964 S.W.2d 520 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998); VanBooven
v. Smull, 938 S.W.2d 324,328 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997); Stephenson v. First Missouri Corp.,
861 S.W.2d 651, 656 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993); Mobley v. Copeland, 828 S.W.2d 717, 726
(Mo. Ct. App. 1992); Fox v. Ferguson, 765 S.W.2d 689, 691 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989).
51. 861 S.W.2d 651 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993).
52. Id. at 654.
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is canceled.53 The court noted that Stephenson was not even required to check
the recorded deed to make sure the easements were in place once the
representation was made.54
D. When is a Statement "Distinct and Specific" Enough to Cancel the
Purchaser's Duty?
Another difficult question encountered in these cases deals with the nature
of the representation made by the seller and whether the purchaser was justified
in her reliance. Where will a court draw the line between permissible "puffing"
about general characteristics of a piece of property and intentionally misleading
statements designed to get the purchaser to let down her guard? Obviously, if
the seller makes an intentional misrepresentation in direct response to an inquiry
by the purchaser ("This site was never used as a landfill"), courts will hold the
seller liable if the representation is false. The question is significantly more
difficult when the seller has made less specific representations or when the
purchaser has not asked the "right" question. In Whittlesey v. Spence," the
Missouri Court of Appeals for the Southern District of Missouri held that an
agent's statement regarding title ("It looks all right to me") was a mere
expression of opinion upon which the purchaser was not entitled to rely. 6 Other
jurisdictions have made similar findings when the representation was in the
nature of a sales pitch rather than an affirmative statement about a particular
aspect of the subject property. 7 These cases generally claim to apply a bright-
line rule concerning the unreliability of "mere opinions,"58 but as one can
imagine, the line is very fine and it appears that most of these cases are fact-
53. Id. at 656.
54. Id. See generally Tietjens v. General Motors Corp., 418 S.W.2d 75, 82 (Mo.
1967); Clark v. Edgar, 84 Mo. 106 (Mo. 1884) (fraud may be predicated upon false
representations or concealment although truth could have been discovered in public
records); Wasson, 964 S.W.2d at 527; Mobley, 828 S.W.2d at 726; Fox, 765 S.W.2d at
691; Norris v. Jones, 661 S.W.2d 63, 65 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983) (immaterial that means of
knowledge available); Gamel v. Lewis, 373 S.W.2d 184, 191-92 (Mo. Ct. App. 1963) (no
duty to make any inquiry after a specific representation is made).
55. 439 S.W.2d 195 (Mo. Ct. App. 1969).
56. Id. at 198.
57. See Williamson v. Realty Champion, 551 So. 2d 1000, 1002 (Ala. 1989)
(Agent's statement that house was "very well built" too general to be regarded as material
to purchaser's decision to buy house); Holland v. Lentz, 397 P.2d 787, 790 (Or. 1964)
(Seller represented that house was well built). However, a representation that seller
owned property "lock, stock and barrel" was held sufficiently specific to permit reliance.
Upledger v. Vilanor, 369 So. 2d 427, 430 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
58. See generally Nixon v. Franklin, 289 S.W.2d 82, 85 (Mo. 1956); Budd v.
Budd, 122 S.W.2d 402 (Mo. Ct. App. 1938).
1999]
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specific and provide little insight as to how the rule will be applied in future
situations.
IV. THE INSTANT DECISION
In Droz, the court first analyzed the actual fraud/constructive fraud issue."s
Beginning with the general proposition that rescission of a contract may be based
upon constructive fraud, the court found that the trial court misapplied the law
of rescission by requiring a showing of actual fraud before such relief could be
granted.6" Based upon the foregoing rule, the court noted that the fact that
Trump did not intentionally defraud Droz was immaterial to the question of
whether the real estate contract could be rescinded based upon the
misrepresentations of Trump's agent.6' Once the court dealt with the preliminary
question of whether rescission was even available as a remedy, the court next
turned its attention to the alleged misrepresentation.62 The court questioned
whether Droz had a duty to make an inquiry into the status of the property in
light of the representation made by Trump's agent.63 The court reaffirmed
Missouri's general disclosure rule by stating that a purchaser of real property has
a duty to investigate discoverable latent defects under circumstances that would
place a reasonable purchaser on notice of a potential problem.64 However, the
rule was not applied in this case because the seller (through her agent) made a
material misrepresentation. 65 - According to the court, the purchaser's duty to
make any investigation whatsoever is canceled when the vendor makes a
"distinct and specific" representation concerning the property which induces
action by the purchaser.6 Here, the real estate agent's representation that the
property was suitable for Droz's intended purposes was deemed sufficiently
"distinct and specific" enough to relieve Droz of his duty to investigate potential
latent defects (including information contained in publicly recorded land title
records).67 Because constructive fraud was sufficient to justify rescission,
coupled with the fact that Droz had no duty to investigate latent defects on
59. Droz v. Trump, 965 S.W.2d 436, 440-41 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 441. In fact, the question of whether constructive fraud is sufficient to
justify rescission is so clearly settled that Trump did not contest the issue on appeal. See
Ellenburg v. Edward K. Love Realty, 59 S.W.2d 625, 627 (Mo. 1933).
62. Id. at 443.
63. Id.
64. Droz v. Trump, 965 S.W.2d 436,443 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998).
65. Id. at 444.
66. Id. at 443-44.
67. Id. Droz did hire an attorney to perform a title investigation of the property.
The lawyer did not discover the existence of the MDNR investigation (not surprising
because such information is not recorded), but the lawyer nonetheless withheld any
opinion regarding the property based upon its previous use as a landfill.
[Vol. 64
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account of the seller's representations, the court concluded that the trial court's
decision should be reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
6
V. COMMENT
As Droz and the other Missouri disclosure cases illustrate, the current state
of the law is quite unclear, and predicting how future cases might be decided is
nearly impossible. Much of the difficulty stems from the fact that many recent
cases, such as Droz and Stephenson,69 pay lip service to purchasers protecting
themselves and the investigation requirement, while simultaneously finding other
reasons to protect purchasers through mechanisms such as the doctrine of
affirmative representation. A question that necessarily arises in connection with
this line of cases is whether the courts are demonstrating a willingness to reduce
the investigation required of the purchaser and moving toward a regime that
requires more in the nature of seller disclosure.
A. Caveat Emptor or Seller Disclosure ofLatent Defects: Competing
Policy Rationales
Policy rationales must be examined to determine if the modem trend of
seller disclosure is really better than common law caveat emptor. Caveat emptor
seems reasonable in the sense that traditional views of equity require one who
seeks relief to take steps to protect herself. Another argument frequently cited
in opposition to the modem trend of seller disclosure is that it places too high a
burden on a seller to discover defects of which he or she may not even be aware
and that minor nondisclosures would afford a purchaser an easy way to back out
of a deal. However, relieving a seller of a duty to disclose information that he
knows is material to the purchaser's decision seems patently unfair to the
unsuspecting buyer. As the Florida Supreme Court stated in Johnson v. Davis,
70
"[o]ne should not be able to stand behind the impervious shield of caveat emptor
and take advantage of another's ignorance.',
7
'
The modem approach (as adopted in Missouri) represents a fair and
equitable compromise in that it tends to limit unfair dealing on the part of a seller
while encouraging responsible, prudent conduct by the purchaser. Purchasers are
not allowed to purposefully avoid taking reasonable steps to inspect a property
before buying, and sellers are not allowed to take advantage of unsuspecting
purchasers by failing to disclose problems that they know exist. However, an
obvious problem that arises under such a scheme is determining the scope of a
68. Droz v. Trump, 965 S.W.2d 436,443-44 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998).
69. Stephenson v. First Missouri Corp., 861 S.W.2d 651 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993).
70. 480 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 1980).
71. Id. at 628.
1999]
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"reasonable investigation" and whether typical non-lawyer vendors and
purchasers have any idea what is reasonably discoverable by the other party.
B. What is a "Reasonable Investigation" by a Purchaser of Real
Estate?
Although some cases generally state that no investigation of public records
is necessary when a specific statement is relied upon by the purchaser,' it seems
reasonable to require the purchaser to visually inspect the property and to have
a title search performed. Most prudent purchasers in today's world
automatically take such steps, and there seems to be no compelling reason to
protect a buyer who makes no effort to learn if the vendor actually owns the
property that she purports to convey. Requiring a purchaser to go beyond a
visual inspection and title search proves problematic. For instance, the Pagano73
rule from California, which required the buyer to discover any publicly available
information concerning the subject property, seems to go too far. Is it reasonable
for every buyer to go to the courthouse and search all pending lawsuits to see if
their property is affected? With the vast amount of public information now
available, requiring such a search would impose an overwhelming burden on a
purchaser who would, as a practical matter, be required to contact every state
and federal agency that might potentially take an interest in the property. One
trip to a title company or to the Recorder's office seems reasonable and
manageable; a blanket search of every potential source of problems is far too
broad, especially when the seller has knowledge of the defect. 74
A bright-line rule requiring only physical inspection and a title search
would be easy to apply and understand, but it is probably better that these serve
only as the bare minimum and that the purchaser's duty not always be limited to
these two steps. Many cases, as when a person seeks to buy environmentally
questionable property, might require more than a simple inspection and title
search to classify the purchaser's investigation as "reasonable." A
"reasonableness" standard makes sense because it allows a court to look at the
particular facts of a case when determining whether the scope of a particular
purchaser's investigation was proper under the circumstances. 5
72. Clark v. Edgar, 84 Mo. 106 (Mo. 1884).
73. Pagano v. Krohn, 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d 1, 6 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997).
74. Of course, this formulation is only relevant to situations where the purchaser
has no knowledge of the defect, while the seller does know of the problem. In situations
where neither party knows of the defect, it seems reasonable to put the burden of loss on
the purchaser, as one can hardly expect a seller to disclose information of which she has
no knowledge.
75. This flexibility for judges is especially important in property cases, where the
types of property sold and the sophistication level of the parties varies greatly.
[Vol. 64
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C. Did Droz Conduct a "Reasonable Investigation"?
The Droz court did not apply the Missouri disclosure rule to the facts of the
case because of the affirmative representation made to Droz by the vendor's
agent. The court may have been able to achieve the same result without
resorting to the affirmative representation doctrine if it had simply applied the
prevailing test for disclosure of latent defects.
In applying the modem rule, the key question will always be whether the
purchaser could have discovered the material defect through prudent
investigation. Perhaps one factor to which courts should pay close attention is
the sophistication level of the parties involved. What constitutes a reasonable
investigation for a typical purchaser of residential property may be far different
from what is reasonable for a large corporation purchasing an industrial site.
Droz was a typical small town purchaser, generally inexperienced with respect
to the nuances of real estate conveyancing and environmental contamination.
Droz did know that the site was previously a landfill, but the seller's agent
made sure to let him know that the Trumps had raised crops and livestock on the
property after the landfill had been closed. Surely the fact that the seller had
used the property in a manner consistent with that the purchaser intends supports
a conclusion that the property is suitable for the purchaser's intended use. Droz
visually inspected the property and also hired an attorney to perform a title
search which revealed no defects, even though the attorney refused to give an
opinion as to the environmental condition of the property.76 Trump argued that
Droz had a duty, considering the property's history, to contact the MDNR to
discover the existence of the investigation. 7 The difficult decision for the court
76. Trial Transcript at 70-71. Droz contacted the attorney in order to obtain a title
search after signing the sale contract. While the attorney did not say that the property
would be suitable for Droz's purposes, she also did not say that the property was not
suitable for Droz's purposes. Of course, the entire question of the reasonability of Droz's
investigation would be radically different had Droz obtained the questionable title report
before signing the contract. If he had obtained the report prior to signing the contract,
surely Droz would have been on notice that there might be some serious problems with
the property requiring further investigation.
77. Trump's counsel made the argument that Droz should have contacted MDNR
to find out whether the Department was investigating this property. Droz v. Trump, 965
S.W.2d 436, 438 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998). Droz argued that there was no evidence in the
record that would show whether MDNR would even disclose the information had Droz
made this further investigatory step. Id. The appellate panel never reached the issue
because of its finding that the agent's misrepresentations totally canceled any duty of
investigation by the purchaser. Id. at 444.
To find out whether an average person could discover the existence of an ongoing
MDNR investigation, the Author performed some amateur detective work. I contacted
the MDNR office in Jefferson City regarding a possible purchase of the old Columbia,
Missouri Landfill site. I did not specifically ask if there was any chance that the property
could be put on the Registry (figuring that average citizens normally do not know about
1999]
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would have been whether such an investigation was reasonable under the
circumstances. The court could have been focused on the fact that the property
showed no patent physical defects, and Droz's efforts to discover some problems
(although he did not actually discover the defect), to conclude that the MDNR
investigation was not reasonably discoverable. On the other hand, the court
could have ruled that Droz could have discovered the encumbrances affecting
the property had he made the proper investigation, which presumably would
mandate contacting MDNR in light of the fact that he was purchasing a piece of
land with 40 years of garbage sitting 20 feet under the surface.
The appellate panel in Droz was faced with an extremely difficult choice.
Should the court protect the innocent purchaser who undertook an investigation
(albeit an unsuccessful one) or protect the arguably innocent seller who was
harmed by the actions of her agent? In the final analysis, it seems that Droz's
investigation was reasonable under the circumstances. He spoke with an
attorney whose investigation did not uncover the MDNR investigation, he
visually inspected the property, and he was reassured and encouraged by the
statements of the real estate agent. The modem disclosure scheme seeks to
prevent willful blindness and negligence by a purchaser who sleeps on his rights
or takes steps to avoid learning the truth." Here, Droz did more than the typical
purchaser of real estate and made a good faith effort to learn of any potential
defects that might keep him from using the property for his intended purposes.
The fears of a purchaser purposefully avoiding the truth are not realized under
the facts of Droz. Although the appellate court did not reach the issue of
the Registry of Confirmed Abandoned and Uncontrolled Hazardous Waste Disposal
Sites), instead focusing my attention to general questions regarding the potential uses I
intended for the property. I relayed my entire story to six different people, each of whom
referred me to a different person who they believed could tell me something about this
specific property. The person in charge of solid wastes told me that the Department
periodically monitors old landfills, but mentioned nothing about placing contaminated
properties on the registry.
Finally, I was given a number for the Missouri Superfund Department, whose
representative explained that there was a Registry and that the Columbia Landfill site was
not currently on that list. I asked whether the property might be placed on the Registry,
and she told me that they would tell me (potential purchaser) of the existence of an
investigation, if one was ongoing.
Although the process of talking to so many people was maddening and time-
consuming (over two hours), I did discover that it is possible for a purchaser to learn if
a piece of property is being investigated for possible placement on the Registry. Whether
such an investigation is too great a burden for a purchaser is the tough question, and
again, the question of reasonableness may well be determined by the level of
sophistication of the parties. While two hours of phone calls might not be overly
burdensome, the problem still remains as to whether the average purchaser would even
think to contact the MDNR, especially in light of the previous uses made of the property,
as in Droz.
78. See generally Johnson v. Davis, 480 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 1980).
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whether Droz's investigation was reasonable, one can make a strong argument
that the MDNR investigation was not reasonably discoverable through a
reasonable investigation, that Droz's investigation was reasonable under the
circumstances, and that Droz should have been entitled to rescission even if the
court had not utilized the doctrine of affirmative representation.
D. Affirmative Representation Doctrine: Should a Purchaser's Duty
Be Canceled Entirely?
Statements made about the condition of property by a vendor's agent raise
another set of issues. Although under the Missouri disclosure rule a purchaser
has a duty to find latent defects for himself, the court in Droz adopted the
broader affirmative representation approach and found that the representation
made to the purchaser absolutely cancels that duty.79 A problem with the view
that an affirmative representation entirely negates a purchaser's duty to
investigate is the lengths to which such a rule could theoretically be stretched.
For instance, what if a real estate agent simply states: "This is a good house?"
Is such a statement some kind of implied warranty of quality? Would a
reasonable person really believe that a broker intends to make a legally binding
statement regarding the condition of the property?
In every sale of property, there are seemingly innocuous statements such as
"this is a good house" or "the neighborhood is great" that everyone understands
to be puffing by a broker trying to make a sale. Application of an all-
encompassing rule that any and all representations made by a seller or her agent
can absolutely be relied upon might have the unintended effect of discouraging
disclosure about a piece of property; the seller may be afraid to say anything
about the property, fearing that such statements might be used against her later.
Although a vendor's statements should be taken into account when determining
whether the scope of the purchaser's investigation was reasonable, completely
canceling the purchaser's duty of investigation seems to pose too great a danger.
The alternative approach (a purchaser has a duty to investigate when a
reasonable purchaser would be suspicious) appears to be more in harmony with
the traditional view of equitable relief that one should not benefit from willful
blindness. Just because a purchaser is required to make some investigation when
a reasonable person would be suspicious does not impose an undue burden on
purchasers and such a requirement addresses the willful blindness problem that
equitable relief is designed to prevent. In effect, completely negating a
purchaser's duty gives the buyer a license to bury her head in the sand and avoid
discovery of defects that could have been easily ascertained.
Perhaps the court was using the affirmative misrepresentation doctrine as
a vehicle to avoid making inquiry under the Missouri caveat emptor scheme.
One could argue that the representation made to Droz might be more in the
79. Droz v. Trump, 965 S.W.2d 436, 443 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998).
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nature of a sales pitch 0 or opinion upon which he was not entitled to rely. When
one considers the fact that the statement describing legal obligations was made
by a salesman and not by anyone with authority over the land (such as a
representative of MDNR), it appears that perhaps Droz should not have been
entitled to rely on the statement. As described above, the appellate panel in Droz
probably could have found for Droz without resorting to the affirmative
representation doctrine by applying the Missouri disclosure rule and finding that
Droz's investigation was reasonable under the circumstances. The fact that an
arguably harmless statement will be used by courts to void a transaction is just
more evidence of modem courts' willingness to go to greater lengths than ever
to protect innocent purchasers of real property, even in situations where the seller
has no evil intent in making the representations.
E. A Suggestion for Clarifying the Law and Making Outcomes More
Predictable
One practical suggestion for clarifying and simplifying the law in this area
would be incorporating the specific representation doctrine into the modem
disclosure analysis would clarify and simplify the law in this area. A court could
utilize both doctrines by considering any representations made by the vendor (or
her agent) when analyzing whether the investigation by the purchaser was
reasonable. Under this approach, instead of automatically canceling a
purchaser's duty to investigate, a court would ask: "In light of the vendor's
representations, was the investigation undertaken by the purchaser reasonable
under the circumstances?" The practical advantage of combining the two
doctrines at work in Droz (affirmative representation & caveat emptor) is that
practitioners would no longer have to guess whether a court will apply the
disclosure analysis or the affirmative representation doctrine or both. Under this
system, courts will have the same power to look at the particular circumstances
of these fact-specific cases, and the parties will know with certainty the nature
of the controlling law.
VI. CONCLUSION
The modem approach to disclosures as adopted in Droz is clearly the best
way to mitigate the harshness of the common law caveat emptor rule without
making the seller bear the burden of an implied warranty of quality. Courts
should be careful to make sure that the affirmative representation doctrine is not
stretched so far as to effectively destroy the purchaser's duty to make some effort
to protect himself. Although the statement made to the purchaser in Droz was
probably "distinct & specific" enough to allow proper application of the
affirmative representation doctrine, a scheme that completely negates the buyer's
80. See supra note 57.
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duty probably goes beyond what is necessary to assure reasonable protection for
purchasers. Under the standard articulated in Droz, a purchaser is under no duty
to make any investigation into the nature of the property once an affirmative
representation is made by a seller. This formulation seems to go too far because
it effectively gives a purchaser a "Get Out of Jail Free" card if the buyer can find
some defect, coupled with some type of statement by the vendor or agent
regarding the quality of the property. Under the Droz formulation of the
affirmative representation doctrine, sellers (and brokers) must be more careful
than ever about what they say because it appears that courts are showing an
increased willingness to find creative ways to protect innocent purchasers. One
way to clear up some of the confusion in this area of the law would be for courts
to incorporate analysis of the vendor's statements into the question of whether
the investigation made by the purchaser was in fact reasonable. Considering
Droz's broad application of the affirmative representation doctrine, it is
becoming increasingly clear that the seller is now the party who needs to beware.
TIMOTHY A. REUSCHEL
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